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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its brief opposing this Petition for Review, Pointe Meadows1 admits that it 
purchased the Lehi property and filed a Notice of Intent after the Department warned it "not 
to purchase land, submit a Notice of Intent or submit a License Application at that time 
because the Legislature would be considering a moratorium. . . . " Brief at p. 9, fflf 4-5. 
Ignoring that warning, Pointe Meadows rushed to take advantage of this loophole in the law 
and then joined with the Department to oppose Petitioners' efforts to intervene in the 
licensing proceedings for nine months while Pointe Meadows constructed a facility so that 
the Department could issue a Medicare-only license and argue that this appeal should be 
dismissed as moot. The Department previously described such licenses as unfair "cherry 
picking" (R-pp. 26-27) and warned that this conduct not only threatens to destroy facilities 
that "share equally in the responsibility to care for Medicaid patients", it threatens the quality 
of care received by the very patients the Department is charged to protect. Id. 
That is why the facts of this case are so disturbing: charged by the Legislature with 
the responsibility to immediately halt the issuance of Medicare-only licenses except for those 
applicants who filed an "application" before February 28, 2007, the Department issued a 
Medicare-only license to a facility that not only failed to file an "application" before the 
statutory deadline, it knew the Legislature intended to immediately halt such conduct before 
filing its Notice of Intent and before incurring any of the costs associated with filing an 
1
 Pointe Meadows now calls itself Stonehenge, but Petitioners used Pointe Meadows in the 
original Petition to Intervene and have continued to do so throughout this proceeding. 
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application. Pointe Meadows, by its own admission, is not the type of applicant the 
Legislature intended to except from the moratorium. 
Nor does Pointe Meadows dispute the severity of the harm caused to Petitioners and 
their Medicaid patients by the licensing of a Medicare-only facility in Orem, Utah after the 
moratorium. (Petitioners'Brief at pp. 25-26, nn. 11-12.) Instead, Respondents argue that the 
Department had the "discretion" to "interpret" the narrow statutory exception permitting the 
granting of Medicare-only licenses to entities that filed an "application" on or before 
February 28, 2007, to include entities like Pointe Meadows that filed a "Notice of Intent" 
instead of a "Request for Agency Action/License Application." The latter is the form 
designated in the Department's Rules as an "application" as of February 28, 2007, when the 
Legislature enacted the moratorium incorporating that term. UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R432-2-
6(1). 
For the reasons set forth in Petitioners' Brief, Respondents' argument is contrary to 
fundamental principles of statutory construction which "presume that the Legislature used 
each word advisedly" and "will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already 
there." Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 2001 UT 112 f 
30, 38 P.3d 291. When the Legislature enacted the moratorium on February 28, 2007, a 
"Notice of Intent" was a different form and procedure than a "Request for Agency 
Action/Application" as evidenced by the Department's attempt to retroactively excuse Pointe 
Meadows' failure to file an "application" by amending UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R432-2-6 to 
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state that the exception "shall be met if a nursing care facility filed a notice of intent or 
application with the Department prior to March 1, 2007" (emphasis added). The 
Department's decision to grant a Medicare-only license to Pointe Meadows violates the 
moratorium against licensing conduct that the Legislature concluded was unfair and harmful 
to the public interest. That decision should be reversed. 
Even assuming (contrary to the plain meaning of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 26-21-23) that 
Pointe Meadows qualified for an exception to the moratorium, that exception lapsed when 
Pointe Meadows changed the proposed location of its facility from Lehi to Orem. The 
Department approved that change without even considering critically important factors such 
as (1) whether Pointe Meadows' receipts from the sale of the Lehi property exceeded its pre-
moratorium investment in preparing to apply for a Medicare-only license; (2) the impact of 
the move on Petitioners and their Medicaid patients (allowing a cream skimmer in the Orem 
market has resulted in a loss to Petitioners of approximately one third of their revenues), and 
(3) whether alternative locations would have alleviated the devastating impact on Petitioners 
and the Medicaid program. The Department's failure to consider these factors in deciding 
whether to allow Pointe Meadows to change locations after the moratorium constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. Had Petitioners been allowed to intervene, they would have offered 
evidence on these factors that the Department was required to at least consider before 
approving a change in location after the moratorium. 
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By refusing to allow Petitioners to intervene, the Department appears to have 
deliberately prevented any inquiry into what the Department described as "unusual 
circumstances" surrounding its decision to allow a location change that "is not to be taken 
as precedent." (R-p. 361.) Petitioners believe that these "unusual circumstances" may have 
involved conduct that would preclude Pointe Meadows from invoking the moratorium 
exception.2 At a minimum, the Department's decision denying intervention should be 
reversed so that these questions can be properly examined and critical evidence relating to 
the decision to issue a Medicare-only license at the Orem location can be considered and 
analyzed. 
There is simply no valid justification for the Department's unusual efforts to avoid 
scrutiny of its conduct by denying interested parties the right to intervene. Petitioners sought 
to intervene more than nine months before the Pointe Meadows license was issued on 
2As explained in their opening brief, had Petitioners been allowed to take discovery in this 
proceeding, they would have inquired into why Pointe Meadows filed a Notice of Intent to 
construct a facility on property in Lehi when it was public knowledge that the Lehi property 
was located in a future freeway corridor that UDOT would never allow to be used for a 
nursing home facility. Petitioners'Brief at p. ll ,n.7. Petitioners believe, without the benefit 
of discovery, that Pointe Meadows could have used the Lehi site to file a "notice of intent", 
deliberately delaying public disclosure of its move to the Orem site until after the Department 
amended Rule 432-2-6 and "clarified" that Pointe Meadows was exempt from the 
moratorium. Had Pointe Meadows disclosed the Orem move before Rule 432-2-6 was 
amended, facilities in Orem would have vigorously opposed a rule retroactively allowing a 
Medicare-only facility to destroy their businesses through unfair competitive practices 
condemned by the Legislature. Petitioners also would have pursued discovery to determine 
what, if any, criteria the Department used to justify sanctioning Pointe Meadows' move after 
the moratorium and whether Pointe Meadows incurred any losses as a result of the eminent 
domain issue. 
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January 12, 2009. The Department, at Pointe Meadows1 urging, sat on the request for eight 
months while Pointe Meadows completed construction of its new facility so that the 
Department, without notice or warning, could issue a provisional Medicare-only license to 
Pointe Meadows and then deny Petitioners' request to intervene as "untimely11 and "moot." 
Faced with this apparent "stonewalling" by the Department, Petitioners immediately 
moved this Court to stay the issuance of a standard license, a motion that the Department 
ignored when it issued a standard license to Pointe Meadows while the motion to stay was 
pending before this Court. The Department then filed a motion to dismiss the entire appeal 
as "moot", followed by a second motion to dismiss for lack of capacity. Even in their briefs 
opposing Petitioners' appeal, the Department and Pointe Meadows continue to urge the Court 
not to review the merits of the decision to grant a license to Pointe Meadows after the 
moratorium because (1) Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) Petitioners 
failed to "demonstrate that the procedures afforded by intervention would have permitted 
them to discover or produce any evidence relevant" to the moratorium issue, and (3) 
Petitioners lack capacity. Pointe Meadows1 Brief at 23; Department Brief at 16. 
Surely, the issue of whether the Department should grant a Medicare-only license to 
an applicant that does not appear to qualify under the narrow exception to the Legislative 
prohibition against such licenses deserves a thorough review on the merits after interested 
parties are allowed to exercise their statutory right to intervene. Petitioners respectfully 
submit that this Court should reject the Department's efforts to (1) deprive Petitioners of their 
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intervention rights under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and (2) avoid the review 
and scrutiny that are fundamental to the integrity of our system of justice. 
II. THE DEPARTMENT MISINTERPRETED AND VIOLATED THE 
MORATORIUM BY ISSUING POINTE MEADOWS A LICENSE 
The Department misinterpreted and violated the moratorium in UTAH CODE ANN. § 
26-21-23(5)(a) by issuing a license to Pointe Meadows despite its failure to file an 
application prior to February 28, 2007. When the Legislature imposed the moratorium on 
that date, only the Request for Agency Action/License Application form"... serve[d] as the 
formal document upon which a licensing decision will be based." (R-p. 63). A Notice of 
Intent was not even mentioned in the Department's rules until the Department amended UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE § R432-2-6 three months after the moratorium took effect. That amendment 
did not just interpret the moratorium law, it changed it by expanding the definition of 
"application11 to include notices of intent. 
A. Section 26-21-23 Does Not Grant the Department Discretion to 
Interpret or Change the Meaning of " Application." 
The Department argues that the Legislature has granted it "broad discretion to 
determine what constitutes an application" based on UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-21-23, which 
provides that "an application for a license shall be made to the Department in a form 
prescribed by the Department." Department's Brief at 23; Pointe Meadows1 Brief at 26. As 
the Utah Supreme Court stated in Esquivel v. Labor Commission of Utah, "an agency's 
statutory construction should only be given deference when there is a grant of discretion to 
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the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the statute or 
implied from the statutory language." 2000 UT 66 at f^ 16, 7 P.3d 777. The Esquivel court 
held that a statute granting the Labor Commission "the full power, jurisdiction and authority 
to determine the facts and apply the law" (UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-1-301) did not constitute 
a "grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language" in Section 34A-2-106(5) 
because "the statutory terms of [that] section are of a specific nature and do not connote a 
general grant of discretion." Id. at fflf 16-18. 
Here, the statutory terms of Section 26-21-23 relate specifically to the prohibition 
against issuing Medicare-only licenses and do not include an express or implicit grant of 
discretion to interpret the meaning of "application". The statute cited by the Respondents 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-21-5) was enacted prior to the moratorium and was not in any way 
referenced or incorporated into that statute when it was enacted on February 28, 2007. 
Absent a specific grant of discretion, 
[a]n agency's interpretation or application of statutory terms should be 
reviewed under the correction of error standard. Additionally, if the 
legislative intent concerning the specific issue can be derived through 
traditional methods of statutory construction, the agency's interpretation 
will be granted no deference and the statute will be interpreted in accord 
with its legislative intent. 
Id. at Tf 14 (citations omitted). 
Traditional methods of statutory construction presume "that the Legislature in using 
a term which has a well defined meaning at the time of a legislative enactment intended that 
meaning to be employed." Paprocki v. Jackson County, 142 Mich. App. 785, 791, 371 NW 
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2d450,453 (19&5);InreNorthwestCapitalMgt.,2tf 
(1985). On February 28, 2007, when the Utah Legislature enacted Section 26-21-23, 
"application" meant a Request for Agency Action/License Application.3 Had the Legislature 
intended that filing a Notice of Intent satisfy the moratorium it would have used "Notice of 
Intent" in the legislation. Instead, it used "application" which was defined as a "Request for 
Agency Action" when the moratorium was enacted. As mandated by Associated General 
Contractors, 2001 UT 112, this Court must presume the Legislature used "application" 
advisedly and cannot infer substantive terms into the text of the statute (like "notice of 
intent") that "are not already there." Id. at \ 30. 
B. Respondents' Arguments for Construing Section 26-21-23 
Erroneously Assume that the Application Must Be Complete to 
Qualify for an Exception, 
The Department argues that reading the word "application" to mean only the form 
captioned "Request for Agency Action/License Application" would render the exception in 
Section 26-21-23(5) meaningless because other rules require numerous "clearances" that 
"only are available in the middle of facility construction" before an application is considered 
"complete". Department Brief at 24. Petitioners acknowledge that filing a Request for 
Agency Action/License Application begins the licensing process, it does not complete it.4 
3UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R432-2-6(l) states: "An applicant for a license shall file a Request 
for Agency Action/License Application with the Utah Department of Health on a form 
furnished by the Department." This is the first requirement in the application process. 
4Other applicants filed the required Request for Agency/License Application before the 
moratorium without having started construction. Pointe Meadows filed its Request for 
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Petitioners are not arguing, however, that the application process had to be completed to meet 
the moratorium criteria; the exception to the statutory moratorium merely requires that the 
application process be commenced with a Request for Agency Action/License Application 
filed before February 28, 2007. The Department simply fails to address the significantly 
greater commitment and expenditure of resources required to file a "Request for Agency 
Action" than is required to file a Notice of Intent. See Petitioners' Brief at p. 10, ffif 5-6. By 
using the word "application" instead of "notice of intent", the Legislature intended to limit 
the exception to those entities who had incurred the expense and cost associated with filing 
a Request for Agency Action. Pointe Meadows did not meet that requirement by the 
statutory deadline. 
The Department and Pointe Meadows also argue that "by excepting from the 
requirements of Section 26-21 -23(2) those applicants who filed their application by February 
28, 2007, and their working plans by July 1, 2008, the Legislature demonstrated its 
understanding that an applicant entitled to the benefit of the statutory exception would have 
submitted an 'application' long before 'working drawings' were available." Department Brief 
at 25. Again, this argument is based on a misreading of Petitioners' argument that the statute 
requires a "completed" application in order to qualify for the moratorium exception. Nothing 
would have prevented an applicant who filed a Request for Agency Action/License 
Application by February 28,2007 from submitting working plans by July 1,2008 to meet the 
Agency Action March 29, 2007 without having begun construction. 
528366.1 9 
two-part criteria of the exception. There is no inconsistency between filing a Request for 
Agency Action and the exception to the moratorium. 
Finally, the Department argues that Petitioners1 reliance on Rule 432-2-6(1) as the 
Department's definition of "application" is misplaced because that rule merely prohibits 
applicants from using "a homemade application form." Brief at 25. The plain meaning of 
the language used in Rule 432-2-6(1) is that the only way to commence the licensing process 
is to file a Request for Agency Action/License Application. This Court can rule as a matter 
of law that the meaning of the word "application" in Section 26-21-23(5) is the Request for 
Agency Action/License Application referred to in Rule 432-2-6. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT ERRED IN ALLOWING POINTE MEADOWS 
TO CHANGE ITS LOCATION FROM LEHI TO OREM 
The Department and Pointe Meadows argue that the Department had discretion to 
approve Pointe Meadows' post-moratorium request to move its facility from Lehi to Orem. 
Department Brief at 26; Pointe Meadows Brief at 31. 
A. The Department Did Not Have Discretion Under the Moratorium 
to Allow Pointe Meadows to Change Its Address from Lehi to 
Orem. 
The Legislature imposed the moratorium to immediately terminate the issuance of 
Medicare-only licenses that "cherry pick" the highest paying clients for their facilities. (R-
pp. 26-27.) A statute intended to stop that harm immediately should not be interpreted 
expansively in a way that permits the harm to continue. Absent an express grant of authority 
allowing the Department to issue Medicare-only licenses to applicants who change their 
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location after the effective date, the Department did not have the discretion to issue such a 
license to Pointe Meadows at the Orem location. 
B. Allowing Pointe Meadows to Move From Lehi to Orem Was 
Unreasonable and an Abuse of Discretion. 
Even assuming that the Department had discretion to allow a location change after the 
moratorium, in exercising that discretion the Department was required to act reasonably. See 
LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41,17; MortonInt% 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). "An 
agency has abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the context of the 
language and purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable." Sullivan v. Utah Bd. of Oil, 
Gas and Mining, 2008 UT 44 f^ 10, 189 P.3d 63, quoting Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. 
of the Utah State Tax Comm% 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). 
The Department acted unreasonably by refusing to consider critical arguments and 
evidence relating to the impact of Pointe Meadows' location change on the policies behind 
the moratorium. For example, the purpose behind the limited exception to the moratorium — 
preventing forfeiture of investments made by applicants who filed an application before 
February 28,2007 — does not apply to an applicant whose project is terminated by the threat 
of eminent domain proceedings that are likely to result in compensation to the applicant for 
the costs incurred. The Department prevented Petitioners from discovering the extent to 
which Pointe Meadows' investment in the project prior to February 28, 2007 was recouped 
through the sale of the Lehi property in response to UDOT's condemnation threats. Even 
assuming that Pointe Meadows had satisfied the "application" requirement by filing a Notice 
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of Intent (an assumption contrary to the plain meaning of the statute), it would not be 
reasonable under the moratorium to approve a Medicare-only license at a new location if the 
justification for the exception were eliminated by the sale of property at the location 
identified in the Notice of Intent. The Department did not even consider this possibility and 
it prevented Petitioners from presenting evidence or argument on this important factor. 
The Department approved Pointe Meadows' move on the ground that a 12-mile move 
and a 36-bed Medicare facility could not possibly cause the harm and substantially prejudice 
Petitioners. (R-pp. 475, 479.) But there is not a shred of evidence in the record to support 
this conclusory justification. It is axiomatic that a Medicare-only facility only one mile away 
in the same city will be able to cream skim more Medicare patients from existing facilities 
in that city than would a facility 12 miles north in another city. The Department itself knew 
that providers like Petitioners need only lose $2.37 per day or 3.3 Medicare patient days 
before they begin losing money. (R-p. 26.) The Department deliberately precluded 
Petitioners from intervening to present evidence and argument on this critical issue. 
Nor is there any evidence in the record that the Department considered alternative 
locations for the move that would have been less devastating to Petitioners than the Orem 
location. Surely, Pointe Meadows could have purchased other property in Lehi that would 
not have placed a cream skimmer in direct competition with facilities like Petitioners that 
"share in the responsibility to care for Medicaid patient." (R-pp. 26-27.) The Department 
cannot, in good faith, argue that it acted "reasonably" in approving a post-moratorium 
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transfer of Pointe Meadows' facility from Lehi to Orem when it failed to even consider less 
burdensome alternatives that would have prevented or reduced the harm that the Legislature 
intended to prevent when it enacted the moratorium against Medicare-only licenses. 
Not only did the Department fail to consider the impact of Pointe Meadows' request 
to change locations on the interests the Legislature sought to protect by enacting the 
moratorium, it refused to consider any evidence or argument from the very parties that the 
Legislature intended to protect by prohibiting unfair cream skimming. That refusal alone 
renders the Department's decision to approve the transfer from Lehi to Orem unreasonable 
and reversible as an abuse of discretion. 
IV. THE DEPARTMENT ERRED BY DENYING PETITIONERS1 
PETITION TO INTERVENE 
There is more at stake here than just one bad decision that threatens to destroy 
businesses that have faithfully complied with the requirement to share "equally in the 
responsibility to care for Medicaid patients" despite the below-cost reimbursement rates paid 
by the State. The Department's conduct in refusing to allow Petitioners to participate in a 
process that threatens their very survival undermines the fundamental principles of fairness 
and open government that are at the core of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
A, The Decision to Deny Intervention was not "Harmless" Error. 
Realizing that its refusal to grant Petitioners' request to intervene is indefensible, the 
Department argues that the denial was "harmless" and did not substantially prejudice 
Petitioners. Petitioner Orchard Park's Medicare revenues plummeted 61 percent between 
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December 2008 when the Department granted Pointe Meadows a Medicare-only license and 
February 2009. In that short time period, Orchard Park's overall revenues dropped 31 
percent. As of this past May revenues have dropped 33 percent over last year. Petitioner 
Rock Canyon's Medicare days have dropped 38 percent from the first six months of 2008 to 
the first six months of 2009 and revenues have fallen 36 percent. In an industry where 
margins are thin and competition is intense, these losses threaten the very survival of 
facilities that are dually licensed and required to serve all patients, not just the Medicare 
patients Pointe Meadows targets. The Department's argument that the denial of intervention 
was "harmless" is without merit. 
Nor is there any basis for the Department's claim that it was proper to deny 
intervention and a "formal hearing at this late date." (R-p.479.) Petitioners petitioned to 
intervene more than nine months before the Department issued Pointe Meadows its 
Medicare-only license. Had the Department and Pointe Meadows not stonewalled, the 
Department could have easily addressed Petitioners' petition without materially impairing the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the proceeding in satisfaction of the second prong of the 
intervention test in UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-207. The Department's own counsel conceded 
that Petitioners satisfied the second prong of the intervention test.5 
5In the "Utah Department of Health Statement on Intervention," Department counsel wrote: 
The Bureau's delays in acting upon this matter should not form the basis to 
defeat petitioners in the second prong of the test. Allowing intervention at a 
time when the applicant's facility is near completion would appear to interfere 
with the prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings. However, 
Intervenors petitioned for intervention in a manner that should not have 
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B. Whether the Issuance of a Medicare-only License to Pointe 
Meadows Violated the Moratorium is an Issue that the Department 
was Required to Address in Ruling on the Petition to Intervene. 
The Department and Pointe Meadows also argue that the Department was not 
obligated to rule on Petitioners' claim that the Department violated the moratorium in the 
context of Petitioners' petition to intervene. Department Brief at 21; Pointe Meadows' Brief 
at 23. Again, the Department is taking a position on appeal that its own counsel rejected in 
the proceedings below: 
To meet the first prong of the test, Intervenors rely on the recently enacted 
Medicare-only moratorium statute, Utah Code §26-21-23, as a Legislative 
pronouncement that existing facilities should enjoy protection from the 
Medicare-only competitors. Competitors who would skim the cream of 
Medicare rehabilitation services that aire reimbursed at a higher rate and that 
help Medicaid nursing facilities to better offer rehabilitation services to all their 
residents. Whether this statute and its intended purposes provide sufficient 
basis for Intervenors to argue that their legal interests may be 
substantially affected if the Bureau improperly issues a license in violation 
of the Medicare-only moratorium statute is the threshold issue that the 
Bureau has asked the hearing officer to determine, (Emphasis added). 
(R-p. 450.) 
As its own counsel conceded, the Department was obligated to address this issue under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 63G-4-403(4)(c) in acting on the petition to intervene. The Department's 
failure to do so is reversible error with no deference given to the agency. EAGALA, INC. v. 
Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 43,17, 157 P.3d 334. 
delayed the Bureau in granting a license, having filed their petition March 25, 
2008. (R-pp. 449-450.) 
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C. Pointe Meadows1 Licensing Proceeding was a Formal Agency 
Adjudication in Which Petitioners are Entitled to Intervene, 
Pointe Meadows makes the argument that the Department properly denied Petitioners' 
petition to intervene because Pointe Meadows' licensing proceeding was not an adjudicative 
proceeding but instead was an initial licensing decision or agency determination under the 
Department's rules. Pointe Meadows Brief at 18-19. The Department rejected this argument 
in its brief on intervention filed in the proceedings before Department Administrative Law 
Judge Clark: 
Stonehenge contends that a decision whether to grant a license is only an initial 
agency determination under R432-30-2(2) and that intervention is not allowed 
because there is no administrative adjudication in which to intervene. 
Subsection R432-30-3(3) allows for the commencement of an agency action 
after an initial agency determination. However, Subsection R432-30-3(3) 
cannot cut off the right to commence an agency action as provided in Utah 
Code §63G-4-201. The Stonehenge position would make it impossible for 
even the license applicant to seek a review of an agency determination until the 
license application process, and thus the facility, is completed. 
The Bureau makes many initial agency determinations as part of its licensing 
process. Under Utah Code §63G-4-201 and Health Facility rule R432-30-2(4)? 
a party commences an agency adjudicative proceeding by filing a request for 
agency action. When Stonehenge filed its application for a license (see 
exhibit A), it filed a request for agency action. That request for agency 
action commenced a formal administrative adjudication. 
The Bureau's position on this issue is that an administrative proceeding 
began when Pointe Meadows filed its "Request for Agency Action/License 
Application" on March 29, 2007. (Emphasis added.) 
(R-pp.448-449.) 
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In denying the Petition to Intervene, the administrative law judge acknowledged that 
a request for agency action could initiate an adjudicative proceeding and spent the balance 
of the Order explaining why Petitioners did not qualify for intervention. (R-p. 475.) This 
Court should reject Pointe Meadows' argument that "when Petitioners sought intervention 
there was no formal adjudicative action in which to intervene". 
D. By Refusing to Allow Intervention the Department Deprived 
Petitioners of Their Right to Discover and Present Information 
That is Critical to the Public Interest that the Legislature Sought 
to Protect in Enacting the Moratorium. 
Finally on the issue of intervention, Pointe Meadows claims that Petitioners have not 
demonstrated that intervention would have resulted in the discovery of evidence relevant to 
the question of whether the Department abused its discretion. Pointe Meadows Brief at 23. 
As previously discussed, if permitted to intervene Petitioners would have explored whether 
the Department's decision to allow a change of location was reasonable after the moratorium 
considering that Pointe Meadows' costs in pursuing a Medicare-only license may have been 
reimbursed in the eminent domain proceedings. According to Pointe Meadows, it sold the 
Lehi property under threat of eminent domain by the Utah Department of Transportation, but 
this record does not reflect the purchase price. 
Petitioners were also denied the opportunity to take discovery on the "unusual 
circumstances" behind the move from Lehi to Orem. Petitioners would have explored why 
Pointe Meadows purchased property in a known transportation corridor. Additionally, they 
would have determined if the Lehi purchase and the delayed move to Orem was a tactic to 
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dispel opposition from existing facilities in Orem until it was too late. The Department's 
December 4, 2008 Order denying intervention and providing for issuance of Pointe 
Meadows' license should be reversed. 
V. THE RESPONDENTS1 ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THIS COURT 
FROM REVIEWING THE DEPARTMENT'S CONDUCT SHOULD BE 
REJECTED 
After not acting for more than eight months, approving a one-time exception for 
Pointe Meadows contrary to the moratorium, and rushing through Pointe Meadows' license, 
the Department and Pointe Meadows are attempting to prevent this Court from reviewing 
their conduct. The Department first moved to dismiss the Petition for Review on the basis 
that the petition was moot, but the Department did not address that motion in its brief and 
apparently is no longer making that claim. Next the Department moved to dismiss on 
grounds that Petitioners are not persons under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
lacked capacity to intervene. Pointe Meadows joined these arguments in its Response Brief 
and made one of its own claiming that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies. Petitioners believe the Department and Pointe Meadows have gone to great 
lengths to keep this Court from scrutinizing their conduct because it has been unreasonable 
and unsustainable. 
A. Petitioners Exhausted Their Administrative Remedies. 
Pointe Meadows argues that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 
because the Department's December 4,2008 Order was an initial agency determination, not 
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final agency action. Pointe Meadows Brief at 17-18. As a result, according to Pointe 
Meadows, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 
As stated above, Pointe Meadows advanced this argument to the Department in the 
proceeding below and the Department rejected it. The Department's December 4,2008 Order 
concluded that Pointe Meadows' licensing proceeding was an adjudicative proceeding. The 
Order is entitled "Final Agency Order" and spells out Petitioners' appellate rights in this 
Court. (R-pp. 470-471.) The Department's counsel addressed this issue head in the 
Department's Statement on Intervention and advised the Department administrative law 
judge: 
When Stonehenge filed its application for a license (see exhibit A), it filed a request 
for agency action. That request for agency action commenced a formal administrative 
adjudication... .The Bureau's position on this issue is that an administrative proceeding 
began when Pointe Meadows filed its "Request for Agency Action/License 
Application" on March 29, 2007. 
(R-p. 449.) 
After filing their petition to intervene in this formal administrative adjudication (R-pp. 
153-310), their petition for reconsideration (R-pp. 401-410), their brief on intervention 
(R-pp. 435-446), and their motion for stay (R-pp. 485-498), Petitioners had no other 
administrative remedies to exhaust. Pointe Meadows' argument is without merit and should 
be rejected. 
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B, Respondents5 Claim that Petitioners Lack Capacity is Without 
Merit 
The Department argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 
Petitioners are not "persons" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-103 and they lack capacity. 
Department Brief at 13-21; Pointe Meadows Brief at 32. The Department bases its 
arguments on a claim that Petitioners sought to intervene in Pointe Meadows1 licensing 
proceeding as buildings like the Matheson Courthouse rather than as persons.6 Two 
Petitioners are persons doing business in Utah as licensed skilled nursing facilities registered 
under assumed names and in good standing on the records of the Division of Corporations. 
These Petitioners are identified in the Petition to Intervene under their assumed names. 
Petitioner Trinity Mission Health and Rehab was a registered foreign partnership at the time 
the Petition to Intervene was filed.7 They serve elderly Medicaid and Medicare patients and 
are among the providers whom the moratorium was intended to protect. Unlike Petitioners, 
the Matheson Courthouse is not a person registered on the state's records and conducts no 
business in the state. The Department's argument is without merit and the Court should 
disregard it. 
Petitioners identified themselves to the Department "[a]s existing licensees and facilities in 
Orem, Utah who will be adversely affected if Pointe Meadows is granted a license....5' (R-p. 
153.) That their facilities bear the name of their dbas does not support the Department's 
claim. | 
nSee Petitioners' Request of the Court to Take Judicial Notice filed April 9,2009. Petitioners 
identified their corporate names in footnote 4 of Petitioners' Response in Opposition to State 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss filed in this matter March 30, 2009. 
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Petitioners petitioned the Department in their registered assumed names to intervene 
in Pointe Meadows5 licensing proceeding and UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2-10(1) supports this 
position. Under this provision, a person who transacts business under an assumed name may 
not "...sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, cross complaint, or 
proceeding in any of the courts of this state," If persons cannot maintain any action before 
they register their assumed names, it logically follows that they can file actions in their 
assumed names when those names are properly registered with the state. 
Regardless of whether a party can petition the Department in its registered assumed 
name, Petitioner Trinity Mission Health and Rehab (the name used on Petitioners5 petition 
to intervene - R-p. 154) is also the name in which that entity was registered as a foreign 
partnership when the petition to intervene was filed.8 Thus, the Department's argument fails 
as to that Petitioner because a registered foreign partnership clearly qualifies as a person 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-103. The standing of a single petitioner that qualifies as 
a person is sufficient for purposes of sustaining this appeal. 
Even assuming that the lack of capacity defense applies to an entity suing in the name 
of its dba, the Department and Pointe Meadows waived that defense by failing to raise it 
below. Sullivan v. Utah Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 2008 UT 44 ^ 14, 189 P.3d 63; 
*See Addendum to Petitioners5 Request of the Court to Take Judicial Notice filed April 9, 
2009. Petitioners also argue that Trinity Mission Health and Rehab was not properly 
identified in the Petition for Review because the words "and Rehab of Provo LP55 were not 
included. This oversight can be corrected by amendment as a misnomer. See 9A Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 4566 (If words in a name are omitted they may be 
added under the misnomer doctrine.) 
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Esquivel v. Labor Commission of Utah, 2000 UT 66 f 34, 7 P.3d 777; Shields v. Santana, 
2000 UT App 298; 5owerc Building Company v. ,4/fara G t o Co., Twc, 694 P.2d 876, 878 
(Colorado App Ct 1984). The Department maintains that this general waiver rule only 
applies to petitioners, not to the Department, but that ignores the unique fact that in 
I 
administrative proceedings, the decision maker also participates as a party. Department Brief 
at 14-15. The Department filed a Statement on Intervention along with the Petitioners and 
Pointe Meadows.9 (R-pp. 447-455.) Whether Petitioners lack capacity or are not persons 
bears directly on their right to intervene, but the Department did not object or address these 
issues in its filing and instead waited until this review to raise them. Pointe Meadows also 
failed to raise them. 
The Department's claim that this review in this Court is the first time it could have 
I 
raised these issues is simply not true. It should have addressed them in its Statement on 
Intervention. Otherwise the Department or any other administrative agency could knowingly 
hold issues during a proceeding and raise them on review to defeat this Court's jurisdiction 
and avoid all scrutiny. That is bad policy and is not the law of this state. 
If this Court concludes that Petitioners are not properly described in their Petition for 
Review or their petition to intervene, Petitioners have requested that they be allowed to 
substitute their corporate names as the real parties in interest pursuant to Rule 17 of the Utah 
9The Department referred to Petitioners as "Intervenors" in its filing. (R-p. 450.) Pointe 
Meadows referred to Petitioners by their names, as "Intervenors" (R-pp. 312-313), and as 
"Existing Facilities" (R-p. 499). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. With the Department's delayed objection, Petitioners have not had 
the opportunity before this stage of the proceeding to amend their petitions. Petitioners 
request therefore that if it is deemed necessary, they be allowed to amend their petitions 
pursuant to Rules 15 and/or 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to include their 
corporate names. 
In Tan v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 2007 UT App 93, 157 P.3d 367, this Court 
reversed the trial court for dismissing a complaint as time barred after the plaintiff sued an 
insurance company in the name of its service mark, a non-entity without identity, and then 
amended the complaint to reflect the actual name of the insurance company after the statute 
of limitations had run. This Court concluded that naming the service mark in the initial 
complaint was a technical mistake or a misnomer that could be corrected without prejudicing 
the parties and permitted the action to go forward. Among other reasons, this was true 
".. .where, as here, the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings." 
Id. at 10 citing Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996) quoting 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). This same principle allowing 
technical corrections applies whether the mistake as to corporate names is made by a 
petitioner or a respondent.10 See 9A Fletcher Cyclopedia of Law of Corporations § 4566. 
10The Department's reliance on Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878 (UT App. 1994) is misplaced 
because that case involved the issue of whether a decedent's estate lacks capacity to maintain 
a wrongful death action. Here, there is no dispute that the entities operating in the state under 
properly registered assumed names are "persons" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-103 that 
have capacity to intervene in formal adjudicative proceedings. At most, the deficiency 
identified by the Department is a misnomer that can be corrected by amendment. See Tan 
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Neither the Department nor Pointe Meadows has been prejudiced or surprised by 
Petitioners' use of their common names in this proceeding. Nor would they be prejudiced by 
an amendment substituting Petitioners' corporate names. There would be no additional 
parties or arguments in this matter and neither the Department nor Pointe Meadows would 
be affected differently. The Department and Pointe Meadows know Petitioners; the 
Department issued Petitioners' their licenses and continues to regulate them. Petitioners are 
known in the community where Pointe Meadows operates by the names in which they sought 
intervention in Pointe Meadows' licensing proceeding. Petitioners urge this Court to reject 
the Department's and Pointe Meadows' efforts to keep their conduct from being scrutinized. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Petitioners have been substantially prejudiced by the Department's conduct and 
issuance of Pointe Meadows' Medicare-only license in violation of the moratorium. 
Petitioners request that this Court reverse the Department's decision and invalidate Pointe 
Meadows' license. In the alternative, Petitioners request that this Court reverse the 
Department's December 4,2008 Order denying Petitioners' Petition to Intervene and remand 
for further proceedings in order to determine if Pointe Meadows should be issued a 
Medicare-only license. 
v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 2007 UT App 93, 157 P.3d 367 
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Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2009 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH 
>7fJ. 
Stephen F. Mecnam 
Mark L. Callister 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of REPLY BRIEF OF 
PETITIONERS were served by United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the 15th 
day of September 2009, on the following: 
Annina Mitchell J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Utah Solicitor General Blaine J. Benard 
P.O. Box 140858 Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2663 
j^/v^)^/ 
528366.1 
